

Feature Space Singularity: Out-of-Distribution Samples Concentrate in Trained Neural Networks

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Background: OOD detection for AI Safety

OOD detection for AI safety



Traffic signs in the training set



Unseen traffic signs

- ◇ OOD samples can cause unintended and harmful behaviors of current machine learning systems
- ◇ We want to detect OOD samples and make later actions accordingly.


Current methods for OOD detection are not good enough

- ◆ Two major concerns: performance and computational cost
 - ◆ Single-model methods (e.g., ODIN, MC Dropout) don't perform well
 - ◆ Ensemble-based methods (Deep Ensemble) require training multiple randomly initialized NNs

- ◆ Can we use a single model and still achieve high performance?

Observation and Analysis: OOD samples concentrate in the feature space

OOD samples concentrate in the feature space



The phenomenon seems universal

- ◇ We have tested:
 - ◇ Architecture: MLP, LeNet, ResNet, DenseNet, bi-LSTM
 - ◇ Activation function: ReLU, Tanh
 - ◇ Loss: Cross Entropy loss, Triplet loss, L2-loss
 - ◇ Datasets: MNIST, FMNIST, CIFAR 10, SVHN, ImageNet, CelebA, MSIM
 - ◇ Supervised learning, unsupervised learning (Instance Discrimination)

Explanation: Different moving speeds of features



The "moving speed" of features:

$$\frac{dF_{\theta_t}(x)}{dt} = \frac{\partial F_{\theta_t}(x)}{\partial \theta_t} \frac{d\theta_t}{dt}$$

Note x can be any input; x_m are the training data

$$= - \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{\partial F_{\theta_t}(x)}{\partial \theta_t} \frac{\partial F_{\theta_t}(x_m)^\top}{\partial \theta_t} \partial_m \mathcal{L}_\phi.$$

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Algorithms and Experiments

Algorithm: Ensemble different layers

Algorithm 1: Computation of FSSD-Ensem

Input: Test samples $x = \{x_n^{\text{test}}\}_{n=1}^N$, noise samples $\{x_s^{\text{noise}}\}_{s=1}^S$, ensemble weights α_k , perturbation magnitude ϵ , feature extractors $\{F_{(k)}\}_{k=1}^K$

for each feature extractor $\{F_{(k)}\}_{k=1}^K$ **do**

1. Estimate FSS $F_{(k)}^* = \sum_{s=1}^S F_{(k)}(x_s^{\text{noise}}) / S$,

where $x_s^{\text{noise}} \sim \mathcal{U}[0, 1]$, $s = 1, \dots, S$

2. Add perturbation to test sample:

$$\tilde{x} = x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x \|F_{(k)}(x) - F_{(k)}^*\|)$$

3. Calculate $\text{FSSD}^{(k)}(x) = \|F_{(k)}(\tilde{x}) - F_{(k)}^*\|$

end

Return $\text{FSSD-Ensem}(x) = \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \text{FSSD}^{(k)}(x)$

Evaluation metrics

- ◆ AUROC: Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve.
- ◆ AUPRC: Area Under the Precision-Recall Curve.
- ◆ FPR80: False Positive Rate when the true positive rate is 80%.


Experiments: Detecting OOD datasets

Table 2: Main results. All values are in %.

	Datasets (Architecture)	Metrics	<i>Base</i>	<i>ODIN</i>	<i>Maha</i>	<i>DE</i>	<i>MCD</i>	<i>OE</i>	<i>FSSD</i>
Small-scale benchmarks	FMNIST vs. MNIST (LeNet)	AUROC	77.3	96.9	99.6	83.9	81.7	99.6	99.6
		AUPRC	79.2	93.0	99.7	83.3	85.3	99.6	99.7
		FPR80	43.5	2.5	0.0	27.5	36.8	0.0	0.0
	CIFAR10 vs. SVHN (ResNet34)	AUROC	89.9	96.7	99.1	93.7	96.7	90.4	99.5
		AUPRC	85.4	92.5	98.1	90.6	93.9	89.8	99.5
		FPR80	10.1	4.7	0.3	3.7	2.4	12.5	0.4
	ImageNet dogs vs. non-dogs (ResNet34)	AUROC	88.5	90.8	83.3	89.0	67.2	92.5	93.1
		AUPRC	86.1	88.6	83.0	89.0	66.9	92.6	92.5
		FPR80	19.5	15.2	30.1	18.8	59.2	7.9	10.2
Large-scale benchmarks	CelebA non-blurry vs. blurry (ResNeXt50)	AUROC	71.7	73.3	73.9	74.5	69.8	71.5	78.3
		AUPRC	89.9	91.4	90.9	91.4	88.7	90.7	92.8
		FPR80	52.0	50.3	46.0	47.1	53.2	54.2	39.2
	MS-1M vs. IJB-C (ResNeXt50)	AUROC	60.0	61.3	82.5	63.0	65.5	52.6	86.7
		AUPRC	53.3	55.9	80.6	56.1	59.4	46.6	86.1
		FPR80	61.8	59.4	29.6	56.7	58.8	64.2	22.1
Sequence benchmark	Bacteria Genome (LSTM)	AUROC	69.6	70.6	70.4	70.0	69.3	NA	74.8
		AUPRC	69.9	71.9	69.3	56.0	70.2	NA	75.8
		FPR80	57.4	55.9	53.7	30.0	58.3	NA	47.4


Different scales, different data types

Experiments: Detecting image corruption




Corruption datasets come from ImageNet-C datasets, which contain 16 types of corruptions and each corruption has 5 different levels

Experiments: Detecting image corruption




FSSD has higher mean and smaller variance across different corruptions.

Analysis of ensemble



(a) ImageNet (dogs) vs. ImageNet (non-dogs)



(b) CIFAR10 vs. SVHN

Early layers correspond to low-level statistics; deeper layers correspond to high-level semantics.

Outlook: What's next?

Failure cases?

- ◇ We have just seen some successful cases of exploiting the feature space singularity to detect OOD samples. But there are also failure cases, e.g., CIFAR-10 vs CIFAR-100.
- ◇ Explaining and mitigating the failure cases can lead to clean separation of OOD and in-distribution data/features.
- ◇ Future directions:
 - ◇ Inductive bias of neural network (neural tangent kernel) on OOD inputs, e.g., input norm;
 - ◇ Disentangling spurious features shared by OOD data;
 - ◇ Constraining the learning process to for better OOD detection, e.g., adding bi-Lipschitz constraints, using OOD-related loss functions.

THANK YOU!

Code repository:

https://github.com/megvii-research/FSSD_OoD_Detection

Implemented Algorithms

In this repository, we implement the following algorithms.

Algorithm	Paper	Implementation
FSSD	Feature Space Singularity for Out-of-Distribution Detection	<code>test_fss.py</code>
Baseline	A BASELINE FOR DETECTING MISCLASSIFIED AND OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION EXAMPLES IN NEURAL NETWORKS	<code>test_baseline.py</code>
ODIN	Enhancing The Reliability of Out-of-distribution Image Detection in Neural Networks	<code>test_odin.py</code>
Maha	A Simple Unified Framework for Detecting Out-of-Distribution Samples and Adversarial Attacks	<code>test_maha.py</code>
DE	Simple and Scalable Predictive Uncertainty Estimation using Deep Ensembles	<code>test_de.py</code>
OE	Deep Anomaly Detection with Outlier Exposure	<code>test_baseline.py</code>